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Modern business cycle theories posit that observed aggregate fluctuations in the US economy correspond to optimal decisions of a stand-in household (e.g., 
Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott 1982; Robert G. King, Charles I. Plosser, 
and Sergio T. Rebelo 1988). In these models, the cyclical variation of aggregate 
consumption and employment is a result of the continuous optimum of a household 
that trades current and future goods and leisure in response to stochastic movements 
in prices. However, studies that use aggregate time series data to test the hypoth-
esis of intertemporal substitution often reach negative conclusions. For example, N. 
Gregory Mankiw, Julio J. Rotemberg, and Lawrence H. Summers (1985) (denoted 
MRS hereafter) found that the overidentifying restrictions implied by the theory are 
almost always rejected, the estimated parameters of preferences are highly unstable, 
and the utility function is often nonconcave, leading to elasticities of wrong signs. 
This incompatibility between the representative-agent model and the aggregate data 
is often viewed as a failure of labor market clearing, (e.g., Jordi Galí, Mark Gertler, 
and David Lopéz-Salido 2007).
In this paper, we argue that such a conclusion is premature. We demonstrate that 
an attempt to account for the aggregate behavior of a heterogeneous-agent economy 
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Can a Representative-Agent Model Represent a 
Heterogeneous-Agent Economy†
By Sungbae An, Yongsung Chang, and Sun-Bin Kim*
Accounting for observed fluctuations in aggregate employment, con-
sumption, and real wage using the optimality conditions of a repre-
sentative household requires preferences that are incompatible with 
economic priors. In order to reconcile theory with data, we construct 
a model with heterogeneous agents whose decisions are difficult to 
aggregate because of incomplete capital markets and the indivisible 
nature of labor supply. If we were to explain the model-generated 
aggregate time series using decisions of a stand-in household, such 
a household must have a nonconcave or unstable utility as is often 
found with the aggregate US data. (JEL E13, E24)
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by a “fictitious” representative household often fails. We construct a model economy 
where all prices are flexible and all markets clear at all times. In our model, indi-
vidual households possess identical preferences but face a limit on the amount they 
can borrow and cannot perfectly insure against idiosyncratic productivity shocks (S. 
Rao Aiyagari 1994). Moreover, households supply their labor in an indivisible man-
ner (Richard Rogerson 1988). Under this environment, the optimality condition for 
the choice of hours worked and consumption holds with inequality due to a discrete 
choice of labor supply. Those inequalities are carried over to the aggregate level, 
preventing a nice aggregation of individual optimality conditions.
The lack of systematic movement among consumption, hours worked, and pro-
ductivity in the aggregate data has also resulted in the measurement of a considerable 
stochastic wedge between the representative-agent model and the aggregate data (see 
e.g., Robert E. Hall (1997): V. V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan 
(2007)). Time-varying factors in the marginal rate of substitution between commod-
ity consumption and leisure (e.g., stochastic shifts in preferences, home production 
technology, or changes in labor-income tax rates) are proposed to account for this 
wedge. Our analysis also suggests that such a wedge may reflect imperfect aggrega-
tion rather than fundamental changes in preferences.1
The equilibrium path of our model economy under the exogenous aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks reproduces the volatility and correlation structure of key aggre-
gate variables (consumption, hours, and wages) from the US economy. We then ask 
whether outcomes of our heterogeneous-agent model economy are readily char-
acterized as realizations of an optimizing representative agent. We estimate three 
optimality conditions that a representative agent would face when choosing hours 
worked and commodity consumption. If we were to explain the model-generated 
aggregate time series using decisions of a stand-in household, such a household must 
have a highly unstable or nonconcave utility; the estimated representative household 
often works longer hours and consumes more commodities when the real wage is 
low. Similar to the finding by MRS from the actual US aggregate data, the general-
ized method of moments (GMM) estimates of preference parameters of a represen-
tative household are highly unstable or often have wrong signs.
To investigate the marginal contributions of each friction (capital market incom-
pleteness and indivisibility of labor), we consider additional model economies that 
feature each friction only: the incomplete capital markets with divisible labor econ-
omy (referred to as “incomplete-markets” model) and the complete capital markets 
with indivisible labor economy (referred to as “indivisible-labor” model). According 
to the GMM estimation of model-generated aggregate time series, we find these 
economies can be well represented by optimal choices of a representative agent. In 
the “incomplete-markets” model (with divisible labor), the GMM estimates based on 
model-generated aggregate time series fairly accurately reveal the individual house-
holds’ preference parameters. We show that the aggregation error in the optimality 
condition for the choice of consumption and hours worked reflects the ratio of the 
(CES) aggregate of the marginal utility of individual consumption to the marginal 
1 Our result is consistent with that of Jose A. Scheinkman and Laurence Weiss (1986), who showed that 
capital-market incompleteness can lead to a stochastic term in aggregate preferences.
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utility of aggregate consumption. While this ratio is, in principle, time varying, its 
variation is quantitatively small because the consumption of all households, as well 
as hours, tend to move together in response to aggregate productivity shocks (every-
one is working). This type of approximate aggregation is not possible when the labor 
supply is indivisible. The individual optimality condition holds with inequality due 
to a discrete choice of labor supply and such inequality persists at the aggregate lev-
el.2 However, when capital markets are complete, despite an indivisible labor supply, 
the equilibrium of a heterogeneous-agent economy can be described by an efficient 
allocation based on comparative advantage. In other words, the GMM estimates 
reveal the social planner’s objective function, the equally weighted average of house-
hold utility functions.
Confronted with the inability of an equilibrium model to account for the joint 
behavior of aggregate consumption, hours worked, and wages, MRS proposed three 
hypotheses: aggregation error, economy-wide time-varying preferences, and failure 
of market clearing.3 While it is highly plausible that all of these have contributed to 
the discrepancy between the representative-agent model and the aggregate data, our 
analysis suggests that the incompatibility between the representative household’s 
optimization and the aggregate data may reflect a poor aggregation, which results in 
a stochastic wedge in the aggregate condition rather than a failure of market clear-
ing or exogenous shifts in preferences. When the model economy consists of het-
erogeneous agents and the individual optimality conditions are hard to aggregate, 
an attempt to account for the aggregate time series by an optimizing behavior of 
the representative household fails. The relative risk aversion of consumption is sig-
nificantly underestimated when the aggregate consumption Euler equation is used. 
The parameter that governs the behavior of the labor supply is estimated with great 
uncertainty, just like those from the actual aggregate data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly discusses the GMM estimate 
of three optimality conditions based on the aggregate US time series. In Section 
II, we compute the equilibrium fluctuations of the heterogeneous-agent economy 
with incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor using the bounded rational-
ity method developed by Krusell and Smith (1998). In Section III, based on the 
aggregate time series generated from the heterogeneous-agent model economy, we 
estimate three optimality conditions that a “fictitious” representative agent would 
satisfy. We also provide an example that illustrates the difficulty in aggregating indi-
vidual optimality conditions when both frictions are present. Section IV presents a 
summary.
2 The difficulty in aggregating individual optimality conditions is different from the “bounded rationality” 
(often referred to as approximate aggregation) pioneered by Per Krusell and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. (1998). We 
discuss this with more details in Section IIID.
3 It is also well known that low-wage and less-skilled workers enter the labor market during expansions and 
exit during recessions, making aggregate hours more volatile than the effective unit of hours (G. D. Hansen 1993), 
and making aggregate wages less volatile than individual wages (Mark Bils 1985; Gary Solon, Robert Barsky, and 
Jonathan A. Parker 1994). However, this so-called compositional bias has an impact mostly on the volatilities, not 
on the correlations. Both in the model and in the data, the poor GMM estimates of preference parameters mostly 
stem from the lack of correlation between employment and productivity (wage), which is 0.03 (0.2).
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I. GMM Estimates Based on Aggregate Data from the US Economy
Consider a representative household whose preferences are given by
 max Et  ∑ 
s=0
 
∞
  βs e  c t+s 1−σ − 1 _______
1 − σ  − ψ  
 h t+s 1+γ  _____
1 + γ  f ,
where ct is consumption, and ht is hours worked in period t.
4 The preference param-
eters are β, the discount factor, σ, the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elas-
ticity of consumption, γ, the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity of 
hours, and a constant ψ. When the representative household follows the optimal 
path, three first-order conditions must hold:
(S) ψ   h t γ  ____ 
 c t 
−σ    
Pt ___ 
Wt
 − 1 = 0.
(EC)  Et cβ   c t+1 −σ ____ c t −σ    Pt(1 + rt) ________Pt+1 − 1d = 0.
(EL) Et cβ   h t+1 γ  ____ h t γ     Wt(1 + rt) ________Wt+1 − 1d = 0.
Here, Pt is the nominal price of a unit of ct, Wt is the wage rate, and rt is the nominal 
return from holding a security between t and t + 1. The static first-order condition 
(S) holds regardless of the household’s decisions in the capital market. The Euler 
equation for consumption (EC) will hold even if labor supply cannot be freely cho-
sen, and trading is not possible in many assets, as long as some asset exists that is 
either held in positive amounts or for which borrowing is possible. The Euler equa-
tion for leisure (EL) asserts that along an optimal path the representative household 
cannot improve its welfare by working one hour more at t and using its earnings Wt 
to purchase a security whose proceeds will be used to buy back Wt(1 + rt)/Wt+1 of 
leisure at t + 1 in all states of nature.
If the static first-order condition (S) held exactly, one of (EC) and (EL) would 
be redundant. However, since (S) is unlikely to hold exactly in the data, we use the 
information in all three of these first-order conditions to estimate the parameters 
of the utility function. Following MRS, σ, γ, β, and ψ are estimated by the GMM 
using the quarterly US aggregate time series for the first quarter of 1964 through 
the fourth quarter of 2003. Aggregate real per capita consumption is the sum of 
consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services. The aggregate price 
is the price deflator that corresponds to our measure of consumption. Aggregate 
hours worked represent the total hours employed in the nonagricultural business 
4 We assume a utility function that can be separated into consumption and hours worked, which is popular in 
both business cycle analysis and the empirical labor supply literature. Nonseparability does not change the main 
result of the article, however.
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sector. The  nominal wage is the nominal hourly earnings of production and non-
supervisory workers in the nonagricultural sector. The nominal interest rate is the 
three-month Treasury bill rate. All quantities are divided by the working-age (ages 
16–65) population.
We use two sets of instruments in the GMM estimation. Instrument I consists of 
the following variables for periods t − 1 and t − 2: growth rates of consumption, 
real interest rates, hours worked, and real wages. Instrument II consists of the same 
variables as Instrument I, but for periods t and t − 1. Hence, we can check, through 
Instrument II, if the estimates are severely affected when current variables are used 
as instrument variables. While it is common to include period t variables as instru-
ments in the asset pricing literature (see Lars Peter Hansen 2008; John H. Cochrane 
2001, Chapter 10, for a detailed explanation of the GMM procedure), the existence 
of predetermined prices (such as sticky wages) may warrant excluding the period 
t-variable from the list of instruments (see MRS for this argument). We report the 
estimates using both instruments, and they are not very different from each other. 
The standard two-stage approach as in Hansen and Kenneth J. Singleton (1982) is 
used in performing the GMM estimation. At the first stage, the identity weighting 
matrix is applied to get preliminary estimates of the coefficients. The inverse of 
Whitney K. Newey and Kenneth D. West’s (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix is used as the second-stage weighting 
matrix to derive asymptotically efficient estimates.5
Estimates in Table 1 basically replicate those in MRS. They also share the com-
mon shortcomings of preference parameter estimates in aggregate time series as in 
the studies by Kenneth B. Dunn and Singleton (1986), Hansen and Singleton (1982, 
1984), and Eric Ghysels and Alastair Hall (1990). According to these estimates, pref-
erences are often found to be unreasonable. In the static first-order condition (S), the 
households are not risk averse enough. The estimate of σ is 0.210 (with standard error 
of 0.062) and 0.188 (0.067) with Instruments I and II, respectively. The marginal 
disutility from working is not increasing in hours worked, since the estimate of γ is 
negative. It is −0.569 (0.198) and −0.473 (0.210), with Instruments I and II, respec-
tively. According to these estimates, households would often work longer hours when 
the real wage is low (i.e., consume less leisure despite the low real price of leisure).
In the Euler equation for consumption (EC), the intertemporal substitution elastic-
ity of consumption turns to a negative value (−0.210 and −0.129, respectively, with 
Instruments I and II), although it is not statistically significant. In the Euler equation 
for leisure (EL), the estimate for γ is 0.179 and 0.089, respectively, with Instruments 
I and II, implying a fairly elastic labor supply. One of the stylized facts in aggregate 
labor-market fluctuations is that hours worked vary greatly without a correspond-
ing movement of wages. To account for these, the representative household must 
have had a very elastic labor supply schedule. According to these point estimates, 
the implied value for the intertemporal substitution elasticity of hours worked (1/γ) 
is 5.6 and 11.2. These are clearly beyond the admissible values based on empirical 
micro studies such as those of Thomas E. MaCurdy (1981) and Joseph G. Altonji 
5 The HAC covariance matrix is calculated with a Bartlett kernel and Newey and West’s (1987) fixed band-
width selection criterion.
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(1986). When all three optimality conditions are estimated together as a system of 
equations in the last column of Table 1, σ is −0.046 (with standard error of 0.027), 
and γ is 0.023 (0.044), according to which the representative household exhibits a 
non-oncave utility in consumption and is willing to shift its work schedule even for 
a tiny movement in anticipated wage changes. Each optimality condition is rejected 
according to Hansen’s (1982) J-test of over-identifying restrictions at the significance 
level of 5 percent. When the three optimality conditions are tested together, the 
intertemporal substitution hypothesis is not rejected at the significance level of 10 
percent. When expenditures on nondurable goods (excluding services) are used for 
aggregate consumption, the estimation result moves slightly toward our economic 
priors. The estimate of σ in Table 2 is now between 0.136 (0.333) and 0.843 (0.049), 
depending on the optimality condition and instrument. However, the estimate of 
γ is still highly unstable (either negative or a small value), since it ranges between 
−0.450 (0.115) and 0.413 (0.138).
In sum, two features in the aggregate labor market data led to the wrong sign 
or a small value of γ. A lack of systematic correlation between the cyclical com-
ponents of hours worked and wages (which is 0.39 in the aggregate data after 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering) results in either non concave or unstable utility. 
Accounting for the volatility of hours worked relative to wages (more precisely, 
relative to the real wage evaluated by the marginal utility of consumption) requires 
an elastic labor supply schedule. (At business cycle frequencies, the ratio of the 
standard deviation of hours to that of wages is 1.52.) The discrepancy between 
Table 1—Parameter Estimates Based on US Data  
(nondurables and Services)
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Instrument I
 σ 0.210 −0.210 −0.046
(0.062) (0.330) (0.027)
 γ −0.569 0.179 0.023
(0.198) (0.145) (0.044)
 β 0.994 0.997 0.996
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.0004)
 ψ 0.156 0.113
(0.017) (0.011)
J-statistic 14.368 14.985 14.400 14.493
p-value 0.026 0.036 0.045 0.186
Instrument II
 σ 0.188 −0.129 −0.040
(0.067) (0.308) (0.024)
 γ −0.473 0.089 0.0006
(0.210) (0.122) (0.035)
 β 0.995 0.997 0.996
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.0004)
 ψ 0.164 0.112
(0.017) (0.011)
J-statistic 15.710 14.793 14.987 15.083
p-value 0.015 0.039 0.036 0.208
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the optimality conditions and aggregate data is often interpreted as evidence of 
the failure of labor market clearing due to, say, sticky wages. In the next section, 
we show that a competitive equilibrium obtained from a reasonably calibrated 
heterogeneous-agent model can lead to estimates similar to those we see in the US 
data, which, in turn, implies that nonsensible estimates of preference parameters 
in the aggregate data do not necessarily reflect a failure of market clearing or sto-
chastic components of preferences. Rather, they can reflect imperfect aggregation 
of individual optimality conditions.
II. The Benchmark Model
The model economy is based on Chang and Kim (2007) who extend Krusell 
and Smith’s (1998) heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete capital markets 
(Aiyagari 1994) to a model with an indivisible labor supply (Rogerson 1988). 
Both frictions break the tight link between individual and aggregate labor sup-
ply schedules. The indivisibility of labor implies that the optimality condition 
for hours worked holds as an inequality at the individual level. The incomplete-
ness of capital markets implies an imperfect aggregation of individual optimality 
conditions.
There is a continuum (measure one) of workers who have identical preferences 
but different productivity. Individual productivity varies exogenously accord-
ing to a stochastic process with a transition probability distribution function 
Table 2—Parameter Estimates Based on US Data  
(nondurables)
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Instrument I
 σ 0.834 0.243 0.589
(0.045) (0.381) (0.034)
 γ −0.444 0.379 0.074
(0.108) (0.152) (0.058)
 β 0.996 0.997 0.996
(0.002) (0.0008) (0.0006)
 ψ 9.790 5.110
(1.336) (0.716)
J-statistic 6.048 11.664 12.229 12.308
p-value 0.418 0.112 0.093 0.422
Instrument II
 σ 0.843 0.136 0.624
(0.049) (0.333) (0.029)
 γ −0.450 0.413 0.018
(0.115) (0.138) (0.050)
 β 0.996 0.996 0.996
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.0005)
 ψ 10.189 5.765
(1.470) (0.710)
J-statistic 5.203 12.957 13.570 13.657
p-value 0.518 0.073 0.059 0.418
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πx(x′ | x) = Pr(xt+1 ≤ x′ | xt = x). A worker maximizes his utility by choosing con-
sumption ct and hours worked ht :
 max E0  ∑ 
t=0
∞
  β t e  c t 1−σ − 1 _______
1 − σ  − ψ  
 h t 
1+γ 
 _____ 
1 + γ f
subject to
 at+1 = wt  xt  ht + (1 + rt )at − ct.
Workers trade claims for physical capital, at , which yields the rate of return rt and 
depreciates at rate δ each period. They face a borrowing constraint; at ≥  __ a for all 
t. Workers supply their labor in an indivisible manner (i.e., ht takes either zero 
or  
__ h (< 1)). If he works, a worker supplies  __ h units of labor and earns wt  x t  __ h , where wt 
is the wage rate per effective unit of labor. The representative firm produces output 
according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology in capital, Kt , 
and efficiency units of labor, Lt .
 yt = F(Lt, Kt, λt) = λt  L t α  K t 1−α ,
where λt is the aggregate productivity shock with a transition probability distribu-
tion function πλ(λ′ | λ) = Pr(λt+1 ≤ λ′ | λt = λ). In this model economy, a technology 
shock is the only aggregate shock. This does not necessarily reflect our view on the 
source of business cycles. Since we would like to estimate aggregate preferences, we 
intentionally rule out shocks that may shift the labor supply schedule itself and cause 
identification problems in estimating preferences (e.g., exogenous shifts in aggregate 
preferences, government spending, or the income tax rate).
The value function for an employed worker, denoted by V E, is
 V E(a, x; λ, μ) =  max  
a′∈ e  c1−σ − 1 _______1 − σ  − ψ   __ h 1+γ _____1 + γ  
 + β E C max { V E (a′, x′; λ′, μ′ ), V n (a′, x′; λ′, μ′ )} | x , λD f
subject to
 c = wx __ h + (1 + r)a − a′,
 a′ ≥  __ a ,
 μ′ = T(λ, μ),
where T denotes a transition operator that defines the law of motion for the distri-
bution of workers μ(a, x ).6 The value function for a nonemployed worker, denoted 
6 Let  and  denote sets of all possible realizations of a and x, respectively. The measure μ(a, x) is defined 
over a σ-algebra of  × .
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by V n(a, x; λ, μ), is defined similarly with h = 0. Then, the labor supply decision is 
characterized by
 V (a, x; λ, μ) =  max   
h∈{0,  __ h } { V
E(a, x; λ, μ), V n(a, x; λ, μ)} .
The competitive equilibrium consists of a set of value functions, { V E(a, x; λ, μ), 
V n(a, x; λ, μ), V(a, x; λ, μ)}, a set of decision rules for consumption, asset holdings, 
and labor supply, {c(a, x; λ, μ), a′(a, x; λ, μ), h(a, x; λ, μ)}, aggregate capital and labor 
inputs, { K(λ, μ), L(λ, μ) } , factor prices, {w(λ, μ), r(λ, μ)}, and a law of motion for the 
distribution μ′ = T (λ, μ) such that:
	 •	 Individuals	optimize:
  Given w(λ, μ) and r (λ, μ), the individual decision rules c (a, x; λ, μ), a′(a, x; λ, μ), 
and h(a, x; λ, μ) solve V E(a, x; λ, μ), V n(a, x; λ, μ), and V(a, x; λ, μ).
	 •	The	representative	firm	maximizes	profits:
 w(λ, μ) = F1(L (λ, μ), K(λ, μ), λ)
 r(λ, μ) = F2(L(λ, μ), K(λ, μ), λ) − δ
  for all (λ, μ).
	 •	The	goods	market	clears:
  ∫ 
 
 
 
 { a′(a, x; λ, μ) + c (a, x; λ, μ)} dμ = F(L(λ, μ), K(λ, μ), λ) + (1 − δ)K
  for all (λ, μ).
	 •	Factor	markets	clear:
 L(λ, μ) =  ∫ 
 
 
 
 x h(a, x; λ, μ) dμ
 K(λ, μ) =  ∫ 
 
 
 
 a dμ
  for all (λ, μ).
	 •	 Individual	and	aggregate	behaviors	are	consistent:
 μ′ (A0, X 0 ) =  ∫ 
A0, X 0
 
 
 e   ∫ 
,
 
 
  1a′=a′(a, x;λ,μ) d πx(x′ | x) dμ f da′ dx′
  for all A0 ⊂  and X 0 ⊂ .
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A. calibration
We briefly explain the choice of the model parameters. The unit of time is a busi-
ness quarter. We assume that individual productivity x follows an AR(1) process: 
ln x′ = ρx ln x + εx, where εx ∼ n(0,  σ x 2 ). We choose the values for ρx and σx 
by  estimating AR(1) process of wages from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) for 1979–1992. We control for time effects by annual dummies and indi-
vidual fixed effects by sex, age, schooling, age2, schooling2, and age × schooling. 
Then, we convert the annual estimates to quarterly values. The quarterly values 
we obtain are ρx = 0.939 and σx = 0.287.7 A working individual spends one-third 
of his discretionary time ( __ h = 1/3) in the market. The intertemporal substitution 
elasticity of consumption is one (σ = 1). The intertemporal substitution elasticity of 
hours worked is 0.4 (γ = 2.5). We set the borrowing constraint ( __ a ) to be −2. For 
an average productivity worker in our model, this value corresponds to one half of 
his annual earnings, which matches up roughly with the measures of credit limits 
reported in the survey data.8
We search for ψ such that the steady state employment rate is 60 percent. The 
discount factor β is chosen so that the quarterly rate of return to capital is 1 percent 
in the steady state. An aggregate productivity shock, λt , follows an AR(1) process: 
ln λ′ = ρλ ln λ + ελ, where ελ ∼ n(0,  σ λ 2). We set ρλ = 0.95 and σλ = 0.007. Table 
3 summarizes the parameter values of the benchmark economy.
B. cross-sectional Distribution and Aggregate Fluctuations of the Model
As we investigate the aggregation and its implication for economic fluctuations, it 
is desirable for the model economy to possess a reasonable amount of cross-sectional 
heterogeneity and business cycle volatility. We compare cross-sectional earnings 
and wealth—two important observable dimensions of heterogeneity in the labor 
market—found in the model and in the data. We also argue that the model-generated 
aggregate consumption, hours, and wages (variables used in the GMM estimation) 
exhibit business cycle properties similar to those in the data.
Table 4 summarizes the PSID and the model’s detailed information on wealth and 
earnings. The PSID denotes the family wealth distribution of households in 1983 (1984 
survey).9 For each quintile group of wealth distribution, we calculate the wealth share, 
ratio of group average to economy-wide average, and the earnings share.
In the data and the model, the poorest 20 percent of families in terms of wealth 
distribution were in debt. The PSID found that households in the second, third, 
fourth, and fifth quintiles own 0.50, 5.06, 18.74, and 76.22 percent of total wealth, 
respectively, while, according to the model, they own 2.46, 10.22, 23.88, and 65.49 
7 We use James J. Heckman’s (1979) maximum-likelihood estimation procedure, correcting for a sample 
selection bias because productivities (wages) of workers who did not work are not reported. See Chang and Kim 
(2006, 2007) for details.
8 For example, according to Borghan M. Narajabad (2008), based on the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance 
data, the mean credit limit of US households is $15,223 measured in 1989 dollars.
9 Family wealth in the PSID reflects the net worth of houses, other real estate, vehicles, farms and businesses 
owned, stocks, bonds, cash accounts, and other assets.
VoL. 1 no. 2 39An Et AL.: hEtErogEnEoUS AgEnt EconoMy
 percent, respectively. The average wealth of those in the second, third, fourth, and 
fifth quintiles is, respectively, 0.03, 0.25, 0.93, and 3.81 times larger than that of a 
typical household, according to the PSID. These ratios are 0.12, 0.51, 1.19, and 3.27, 
according to our model. According to PSID, households in the second, third, fourth, 
and fifth quintiles of wealth distribution earn 15.06, 19.01, 23.59, and 32.63 percent 
of total earnings, respectively. In the model, the corresponding groups earn 15.06, 
19.01, 23.59, and 32.63 percent, respectively. We argue that the model economy pos-
sesses a reasonable degree of heterogeneity, thus making it possible to study the 
effects of cross-sectional aggregation.
To obtain the aggregate fluctuations, we solve the equilibrium of the model using 
the “bounded rationality” method developed by Krusell and Smith (1998)—agents 
make use of a finite set of moments of μ in forecasting aggregate prices. As in 
Krusell and Smith (1998), we achieve a fairly precise forecast when we use the first 
moment of μ only (i.e., aggregate capital, K ). The detailed description of our com-
putation procedure is given in Chang and Kim (2007). Table 5 compares the cycli-
cal property of key aggregate variables of the model economy to that in the US 
aggregate data for the first quarter of 1964 through the fourth quarter of 2003. All 
variables are logged and detrended by the HP filter. Our model with an aggregate 
productivity shock generates about 63 percent of business cycle volatility in the data. 
The standard deviation of output in the US data is 2.04 percent, and in our model it is 
Table 3—Parameters of the Benchmark Model Economy
Parameter Description
α = 0.64 Labor share in production function
β = 0.9785504 Discount factor
σ = 1 Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption
γ = 2.5 Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity of leisure
ψ = 151.28 Utility parameter
 
__ h = 1/3 Labor supply if working
 
__ a = −2.0 Borrowing constraint
ρx = 0.939 Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shock
σx = 0.287 Standard deviation of innovation to idiosyncratic productivity
ρλ = 0.95 Persistence of aggregate productivity shock
σλ = 0.007 Standard deviation of innovation to aggregate productivity
Table 4—Characteristics of Wealth Distribution
Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
PSID
Share of wealth −0.52 0.50 5.06 18.74 76.22 100
Group average/population average −0.02 0.03 0.25 0.93 3.81 1
Share of earnings 7.51 11.31 18.72 24.21 38.23 100
Benchmark model
Share of wealth −2.05 2.46 10.22 23.88 65.49 100
Group average/population average −0.10 0.12 0.51 1.19 3.27 1
Share of earnings 9.70 15.06 19.01 23.59 32.63 100
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1.28 percent. This is not surprising because we allow only for aggregate productivity 
shocks. The relative (to output) volatilities of aggregate variables such as consump-
tion, hours of work, and real wages are, however, pretty close to those in the data. In 
the data, they are 0.43, 0.85, and 0.56, respectively, whereas they are 0.39, 0.76, and 
0.50 in our model. In the data, the correlations with output are 0.83, 0.87, and 0.60, 
respectively, for consumption, hours, and real wages. In the model, they are 0.84, 
0.87, and 0.68, respectively. One distinguishing aspect of the model is that hours 
worked is as volatile as that in the data but not highly correlated with wages (0.23 
in our model and 0.39 in the data), despite the fact that the only driving force in the 
simulation is the aggregate productivity shock. This is a striking result because the 
failure to generate a low correlation between hours and wages is known to be one 
of the most salient shortcomings of the RBC models. As we demonstrate below, the 
interaction between the indivisibility of labor and capital market incompleteness 
breaks a tight link between employment and wages at the aggregate level. In sum, 
our model reproduces the business-cycle properties of aggregate variables used in 
the GMM estimation reasonably well.
III. Estimation Based on the Model-Generated Aggregate Data
A. representative-Agent Model
In order to confirm that the GMM procedure recovers the true underlying prefer-
ence parameters, we first estimate optimality conditions using the time series gener-
ated from the representative-agent model with productivity shocks (i.e., the standard 
real business cycle model). We assume that the preference parameters of the stand-in 
household are the same as those in the benchmark economy, σ = 1 and γ = 2.5. 
All parameters except for ψ are also identical to those in the benchmark model. We 
choose ψ so that the steady state hours worked is one-third. We estimate the opti-
mality conditions based on the sample size of 160 observations, close to that in the 
US quarterly time series data. We do not estimate the static first-order condition (S) 
because it holds exactly. The top panel of Table 6 shows the average and standard 
deviation of the estimates using the 2,484 sets of estimations, each sample having 
160 observations, three-fourths of which overlap with the next set. (We simulate 
Table 5—Cyclical Property of Aggregate Variables: Benchmark Model
Variable US data percent Model percent
σy 2.04 1.28σc/σy 0.43 0.39σh/σy 0.85 0.76σW/σy 0.56 0.50
corr (y, c) 0.83 0.84
corr (y, h) 0.87 0.87
corr (y, W) 0.60 0.68
corr (h, W) 0.39 0.23
notes: All variables are logged and detrended by the HP filter. The volatility of output is measured by its standard 
deviation and that of all other variables is measured by the standard deviations relative to output.
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100,000 observations from the model and discard the first 500 observations.) We 
report the estimates based only on Instrument I because they are not greatly affected 
by the choice of instrument. According to the Euler equation for consumption (EC), 
the point estimate of σ is 0.670 (with a standard error 0.197). According to the Euler 
 equation for leisure (EL), the estimate of γ is 3.227 (0.252). When both equations 
are estimated jointly (System), σ is 0.754 (0.198), and γ is 3.019 (0.239). While the 
estimate for β is always 0.99 with high precision, the estimates of σ are smaller than 
the true value of 1, and the estimates of γ are bigger than its true value of 2.5.
This small sample bias becomes negligible when we quadruple the sample size. 
The estimates in the bottom panel of Table 6 are based on 618 sets of estimation, 
each of which has a sample size of 640 observations, three-fourths of which overlap 
with the next set. According to these estimates, σ is 0.929 (with a standard error of 
0.093) and is 1.008 (0.070) in (EC) and (System), respectively. The estimate of γ is 
2.800 (0.197) and 2.651 (0.137) in (EL) and (System), respectively. Figure 1 exhibits 
the distribution (kernel density) of estimates for σ, γ, β, and J-statistic from small 
sample size (solid line) and large sample size (dashed line) datasets generated from 
the model.10 Both σ and γ are now highly concentrated around their true values, 
confirming that the GMM estimation accurately recovers true parameters with a 
large enough sample size.
10 In estimating the kernel density, we used a Gaussian kernel with Bernard W. Silverman’s (1986) automatic 
bandwidth selection criterion.
Table 6—Parameter Estimates: Representative-Agent Model
Equations (EC) (EL) System
Small sample size:
 σ 0.670 0.754
(0.197) (0.198)
 γ 3.227 3.019
(0.252) (0.239)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
 Size 0.170 0.084
Large sample size:
 σ 0.929 1.008
(0.093) (0.070)
 γ 2.800 2.651
(0.197) (0.137)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
 Size 0.129 0.049
notes: For the upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2,484 (618) estimations. Each 
estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations. “Size” represents the empirical size (fraction of estimates 
rejected) of J-test with nominal size of 5 percent.
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Figure 1. Kernel Density of Parameter Estimates: Representative-Agent Model
notes: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel with automatic 
bandwidth). The solid line represents the small sample size estimates (160 observations for each estimation), 
while the dashed line describes the large sample size estimates (640 observations for each estimation). The verti-
cal dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5 percent critical values of the J-statistic.
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B. heterogeneous-Agent Model
Now, we apply the same GMM procedure to the aggregate time series generated 
from our benchmark heterogeneous-agent model. According to Table 7, the estimate 
for σ based on the small sample size (160 observations in each estimation) is 1.116 
(0.079) and 1.107 (0.064) in (S) and (System), respectively. The estimation based on 
the large sample size (640 observations in each estimation) delivers similar values. 
While the estimate for the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption is 
close to the assumed value for individual households, when (EC) is estimated alone, 
the estimate of σ is below that of households. It is only 0.422 (0.220) and 0.639 
(0.127), respectively, for small and large sample sizes, which resemble the low value 
of risk aversion often reported in the literature based on the aggregate consumption 
Euler equation (e.g., Hansen and Singleton 1984; Ghysels and Hall 1990).
The estimation result of the intertemporal substitution elasticity of hours worked 
is striking. As we found from the actual US data (e.g., Table 1, Table 2, or MRS), γ is 
estimated to be either negative or close to zero (although statistically insignificant). 
According to the small sample size estimation, the estimate of γ is −0.065 (0.160), 
−0.158 (0.143) and 0.002 (0.101) in (S), (EL), and (System), respectively. This pattern 
persists in the large sample size estimation. They are all negative values and occa-
sionally statistically significant, −0.139 (0.075), −0.235 (0.064), and −0.013 (0.051), 
in (S), (EL), and (System), respectively. We noted earlier that US aggregate data led 
to the wrong sign or small value of γ for two reasons: a lack of systematic correlation 
between hours worked and wages results in either nonconcave or unstable utility, and 
accounting for the volatility of hours worked relative to wages requires an elastic 
labor supply schedule. Our heterogeneous-agent model also shows similar patterns 
of relative volatility and correlation in aggregate employment and wages and has led 
to similar GMM estimates of γ.
Table 7—Parameter Estimates: Heterogeneous-Agent Model
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Small sample size:
 σ 1.116 0.422 1.107
(0.079) (0.220) (0.064)
 γ −0.065 −0.158 0.002
(0.160) (0.143) (0.101)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Large sample size:
 σ 1.116 0.639 1.095
(0.034) (0.127) (0.023)
 γ −0.139 −0.235 −0.013
(0.075) (0.064) (0.051)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
notes: For the upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2,484 (618) estimations. Each 
estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations.
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Figure 2 exhibits the kernel density of estimates based on both small sample size 
(solid line) and large sample size (dashed line) datasets. The estimates for σ are 
clustered between 1 and 1.5 in both (S) and (System) among small sample size esti-
mates and a similar pattern persists in the estimates based on the large sample size, 
while the estimates are more clustered as the sample size increases. Interestingly, 
estimates based on (EC) exhibit a somewhat bimodal distribution at 0 and 0.5 among 
small sample estimates. With a large sample size, the estimates are clustered around 
0.64. Estimates of γ exhibit either a wrong sign or a small positive number regardless 
−0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
(S)
σ
−0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
(EC) (EL)
−0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
System
−1 −0.5 0 0.5
γ
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5
β
0.989 0.99 0.991 0.989 0.99 0.991 0.989 0.99 0.991
0 50
J
0 50 0 50 0 50
Figure 2. Kernel Density of Parameter Estimates: Heterogeneous-Agent Model
notes: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel with automatic 
bandwidth). The solid line represents the small sample size estimates (160 observations for each estimation), 
while the dashed line describes the large sample size estimates (640 observations for each estimation). The verti-
cal dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5 percent critical values of the J-statistic.
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of the sample size. They are distributed between −0.5 and 0.5, with more concentra-
tion among the large sample size estimates. In terms of the J-statistic (bottom row), 
the hypothesis that a “representative” household optimally chooses hours worked 
and consumption is often rejected, similar to the pattern we observe from the GMM 
estimation based on actual US data. In particular, with a large sample size, the inter-
temporal substitution hypothesis is rejected at the frequency of 98 out of 100.
When the model economy consists of heterogeneous agents and the individual 
optimality conditions are hard to aggregate, an attempt to account for the aggregate 
time series by an optimizing behavior of the representative household fails. The rela-
tive risk aversion of consumption is significantly underestimated when the aggregate 
consumption Euler equation is used. The parameter that governs the behavior of 
the labor supply is estimated with great uncertainty regardless of the equation and 
instrument, just like those from the actual aggregate data.
C. Auxiliary Model Economies
In our benchmark model economy with heterogeneous agents, the difficulty of 
aggregation stems from two frictions: incomplete capital markets and indivisible 
labor. To distinguish the contribution of each, we consider two additional model 
economies that feature each friction: the “incomplete-markets” model with divisible 
labor and the “indivisible-labor” model with complete capital markets.
“Incomplete-Markets” Model.—Households can choose any length of working 
hours but still face the borrowing constraint and (uninsurable) idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks. This is essentially the same specification as in Krusell and Smith 
(1998) with endogenous choice of leisure. The equilibrium of this economy can be 
defined similar to that of the benchmark model with the worker’s value function with 
divisible labor, V D(a, x; λ, μ):
 V D(a, x; λ, μ) =  max    
a′∈, h∈(0, 1) e ln c − B  h1+γ _____ 1 + γ + β E C V D(a′, x′; λ′, μ′) | x, λD f
subject to
 c = w (λ, μ) xh + (1 + r (λ, μ)) a − a′,
 a′ ≥  __ a ,
  μ′ = T (λ, μ).
“Indivisible-Labor” Model.—The next model economy we consider allows for 
complete capital markets but maintains indivisible labor and heterogeneity through 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The equilibrium of this economy can be replicated 
by an allocation made by a social planner who maximizes the equally weighted util-
ity of the population. For an efficient allocation, the planner assigns workers with 
higher productivity to work. If a worker’s productivity is above  x t * , he supplies  
__ h 
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hours of labor. The planner’s value function in the complete market, denoted by 
V c(K, λ), and the decision rules for aggregate consumption, c (K, λ), and cut-off 
productivity, x*(K, λ), satisfy the following Bellman equation:
 V c(K, λ) =  max  
c,x*
 e ln c − B    __ h 1+γ _____
1 + γ   ∫ 
x*
  
∞
 ϕ(x) dx + β E C V c(K′, λ′) | λD f
subject to
 K′ = F(K, L, λ) + (1 − δ)K − c,
where L =  __ h ∫
x*  
∞  xϕ (x) dx is the aggregate effective unit of labor, and ϕ(x) is the 
cross-sectional productivity distribution of workers (unconditional distribution of 
πx(x′ | x)). The cut-off productivity x* satisfies
(1)   
1
 __ c FL(K, L, λ)  
__ h x* = B   
__ h 1+γ _____ 
1 + γ .
The left-hand side of the equation is the utility gain from assigning the marginal 
worker to production. The marginal worker supplies  
__ h x* units of effective labor, and 
the marginal product of labor is FL. The right-hand side of the equation represents 
the disutility incurred by this worker. The upshot is that, under complete capital 
markets, there is a well-defined efficiency condition for labor supply and consump-
tion at the aggregate level.
gMM Estimates from the Model-generated Aggregate Data.—Except for β and 
ψ, the same parameter values are used across all models. For the “indivisible-labor” 
model, β is set to 0.99, and ψ is chosen to be consistent with 60 percent employ-
ment along with  
__ h = 1/3. For the “incomplete-markets” model, β and ψ are jointly 
searched to be consistent with average hours of 0.2 (= 60 percent × 1/3) and an 
interest rate of 1 percent in a steady state. These economies are simulated by the 
same aggregate productivity shocks.
Table 8 shows the parameter estimates from the aggregate time series of the 
“incomplete-markets” (with divisible labor) model. Despite incomplete capital mar-
kets, the aggregate data fairly accurately reveal the individual preference param-
eters with a high statistical precision. With a large sample size, σ is 1.058 (0.024), 
0.828 (0.072), and 0.855 (0.893), according to (S), (EC), and (System), respectively. 
The labor supply parameter also reveals the value assumed at the individual house-
hold level. With a large sample, γ is 2.588 (0.095), 2.828 (0.258), and 2.625 (0.148), 
according to (S), (EL), and (System), respectively. Figure 3 shows that the estimates 
are also highly concentrated around their means. The capital-market incompleteness 
alone does not generate a large aggregation error because, with a divisible labor sup-
ply, in response to aggregate productivity shocks, hours and consumption are highly 
correlated across households, allowing for a fairly precise aggregation. To illustrate 
this, we provide a simple example in Section IIID.
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According to Table 9, aggregate consumption from the “indivisible-labor” (with 
complete capital markets) economy reveals the relative risk aversion of individual 
households. The estimate of σ is 0.963 (0.101) and 1.011 (0.064), according to (EC) 
and (System) with a large sample size.11  The labor supply elasticity at the aggregate 
level is, however, very different from that of households. The estimates of γ are 
0.840 (0.096) and 0.793 (0.065), respectively, for (EL) and (System) with a large 
sample size, implying a labor supply elasticity of 1.19 and 1.26, higher than the 
individual elasticity of 0.4. While aggregate preferences are not necessarily identical 
to individual preferences, the GMM estimates based on the model-generated aggre-
gate time series reveal the social planner’s objective function, the (equally) weighted 
average of household utility functions—there is a well-defined efficiency condition 
under complete capital markets. Figure 4 confirms that the distributions of param-
eter estimates are concentrated around their means.
We have shown that when individual optimality conditions are hard to aggregate 
(due to incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor), an attempt to account for 
the aggregate time series by an optimizing behavior of the representative household 
often ends up with nonsensible estimates for preferences. MRS interpreted the non-
sensible preference parameters estimated from the aggregate time series as evidence 
of the failure of market clearing. Our analysis suggests that the incompatibility 
between the equilibrium outcome of a representative household’s optimization and 
the aggregate data may actually reflect poor aggregation rather than the failure of the 
market—equilibrium outcomes of a heterogeneous-agent economy cannot be easily 
represented by a stand-in household.
11 Note that we do not estimate the static first-order condition (S) for this model economy because it holds 
exactly in (1). Potentially, the estimation of (S) is still possible because aggregate hours and wages are subject to 
the so-called compositional bias. However, the composition bias does not have enough of a time-varying compo-
nent as the economy moves near the deterministic steady state.
Table 8—Parameter Estimates: “Incomplete-Markets” Model
Equations (S) (EC) (EL) System
Small sample size:
 σ 1.057 0.578 0.936
(0.050) (0.181) (0.885)
 γ 2.587 3.310 2.657
(0.162) (0.370) (0.271)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Large sample size:
 σ 1.058 0.828 0.855
(0.024) (0.072) (0.893)
 γ 2.588 2.828 2.625
(0.095) (0.258) (0.148)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
notes: For the upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2,484 (618) estimations. Each 
estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations.
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D. An Illustrative Example
In this section, we illustrate why it is so difficult to aggregate individual opti-
mality conditions when both frictions—incomplete capital markets and indivisible 
labor—are present. To make the analysis simple, we construct an example in a static 
environment. We also abstract from the idiosyncratic productivity (x). Suppose a 
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0 1 2
System
2 3 4
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2 3 4 2 3 4
β
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Figure 3. Kernel Density of Parameter Estimates: “Incomplete-Markets” Model
notes: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel with automatic 
bandwidth). The solid line represents the small sample size estimates (160 observations for each estimation), 
while the dashed line describes the large sample size estimates (640 observations for each estimation). The verti-
cal dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5 percent critical values of the J-statistic.
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worker maximizes the utility, (c1−σ − 1)/(1 − σ) − ψ (h1+γ)/(1 + γ), given the 
budget constraint, c = wh + ra. When the labor supply is divisible, the optimality 
condition for the choice of hours worked and consumption is
(2)  h(a) = a w ______ ψ c(a)σ   b 1/γ .
Suppose the cross-sectional distribution of the asset holdings of individuals is 
denoted by ξ(a). Aggregating (2) for all workers yields
(3)  h = a w ____ ψcσ  b 1/γ ∫      a c (a) ____c  b −σ/γ d ξ(a),
where h and c are aggregate hours and consumption. Equation (3) is almost identi-
cal to the individual optimality condition (2) except for the last term. Rearranging 
(3), we obtain an aggregate relation similar to the static first-order condition, equa-
tion (S), in a representative-agent model:
(4)   
ψh r
 ____
c −σ  = w   
A ∫  c (a)−σ/γ d ξ(a) B γ 
  ______________ 
c −σ .
The last term χ = A ∫ c (a)−σ/γ d ξ(a) B γ /c −σ reflects the ratio of the CES aggregate 
of the marginal utility of individual consumption to the marginal utility of aggre-
gate consumption. For a representative-agent model, χ = 1 as the distribution of 
asset holdings, ξ(a), is degenerate. When aggregate disturbances are introduced in a 
dynamic model, this ratio χ is time-varying because aggregate consumption as well 
Table 9—Parameter Estimates: “Indivisible-Labor” Model
Equations (EC) (EL) System
Small sample size:
 σ 0.672 0.742
(0.209) (0.201)
 γ 1.057 0.964
(0.121) (0.114)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Large sample size:
 σ 0.963 1.011
(0.101) (0.064)
 γ 0.840 0.793
(0.096) (0.065)
 β 0.990 0.990 0.990
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
notes: For the upper (lower) panel, means and standard errors are calculated from 2,484 (618) estimations. Each 
estimation has a sample size of 160 (640) observations.
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Figure 4. Kernel Density of Parameter Estimates: “Indivisible-Labor” Model
notes: The density of parameter estimates are calculated by the kernel method (Gaussian kernel with automatic 
bandwidth). The solid line represents the small sample size estimates (160 observations for each estimation), 
while the dashed line describes the large sample size estimates (640 observations for each estimation). The verti-
cal dotted lines in the bottom panels represent 5 percent critical values of the J-statistic.
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as the distribution, ξ(a), changes over time. According to the business cycle account-
ing adopted by Hall (1997) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), the variation 
of χ will show up as a time-varying wedge between the marginal rate of substitution 
and the real wage. According to our simulation of the “incomplete-markets” (with 
divisible-labor) model, the variation of this wedge is quantitatively small (the stan-
dard deviation of the wedge relative to that of output is only 0.09). With a divisible 
labor supply, the consumption of all households tends to move together in response 
to aggregate productivity shocks, leaving the ratio χ (the ratio of CES aggregate of 
the marginal utility of individual consumption to the marginal utility of aggrega-
tion consumption) virtually unaffected. Thus, the estimation of (3) fairly accurately 
reveals the true preference parameters in (2).
When the labor supply is indivisible, however, this approximate aggregation of 
the individual worker’s intra-temporal optimality condition is not possible because 
that condition holds with inequality. Specifically, in the static environment we just 
described, an individual worker decides to work (h =  __ h ) if
(5)  ΔU(a) =  ce(a)1−σ ______
1 − σ  −  
cu(a)1−σ ______
1 − σ  ≥ ψ   
__ h 1+γ _____ 
1 + γ ,
where ce(a) = w __ h + ra and cu(a) = ra denote consumption when the worker 
is working (employed) and not working (unemployed), respectively. The left-hand 
side, ΔU(a), reflects the additional utility of consumption from earnings and the 
right-hand side reflects the disutility from working. Given the strict concavity and 
continuity of the utility function, there exists a unique reservation asset holdings, a r, 
below which workers supply  
__ h hours. In addition, thanks to the strictly decreasing 
marginal utility of consumption, ΔU(a) = w __ h ˜    c (a)−σ, where cu(a) <  ˜    c (a) < ce(a) 
(mean-value theorem). Then, we can express equation (5) as
(6)   
__ h ≤ a w ______ 
 ˜  
   ψ  ˜    c(a)σ  b 1/γ for a ≤ a r,
where  ˜  
   
 ψ = ψ/(1 + γ). Aggregating (6) for labor-market participants (a < ar ) 
yields
(7)  h ≤ a w ____ 
 ˜     ψ cσb 1/γ  ∫   a≤ar  c  ˜   c(a) ____c  d −σ/γ d ξ(a).
Equation (7) shows the difficulties in deriving a meaningful aggregate relation when 
the labor supply is indivisible. First of all, the inequality at the individual level car-
ries over to the aggregate level. Second, when aggregate disturbances are introduced 
in a dynamic model, the reservation asset level (a r ) for labor-market participation 
itself is time varying. Third, the ratio of the CES aggregate of the marginal utility 
of consumption of participants to the marginal utility of aggregate consumption 
( ∫ a≤ar  [ ˜   c(a)/c ]−σ/γd ξ (a)) is more likely to move because the aggregate productivity 
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shock has a bigger impact on those who participate in the labor market. Moreover, it 
is not obvious how to measure  ˜    c(a) in practice. To summarize, when the labor supply 
is indivisible, individual optimality condition holds with inequality and the aggrega-
tion of those inequalities does not necessarily yield a meaningful relation in terms 
of observable aggregate variables. When the capital markets are complete, however, 
despite the indivisible labor supply, there is a well-defined aggregate efficiency con-
dition (recall equation (1) in Section IIIC).
Finally, we note that the difficulty in aggregating individual optimality conditions 
is distinctly different from the “bounded rationality” (often refered to as  approximate 
aggregation) in Krusell and Smith (1998). The bounded rationality refers to the class 
of equilibrium where agents’ information set is limited. In a heterogeneous-agent 
model with incomplete capital markets, the equilibrium depends on the entire dis-
tribution of assets. In practice, it is impossible to include the entire distribution, an 
infinite-dimensional object, as a state variable. Krussell and Smith show that, in a 
certain class of models, using limited information about the distribution (i.e., the 
first moment only) is almost as good as using all of the information when predicting 
prices.12 For example, agents make their labor-supply decisions (i.e., equation (5)), 
using the forecasted wages based on aggregate productivity and capital. Yet, they 
seldom regret their decisions because the realized wages are almost identical to their 
forecasts.13 Two aspects of the model allow for a successful forecasting of prices 
by the first moment. Given the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production technology, the 
equilibrium prices (marginal products) depend on the first moment only (e.g., aggre-
gate capital). Second, agents try to stay away from the borrowing constraint around 
which their decision rules are highly nonlinear. On the other hand, the real difficulty 
of deriving a meaningful aggregating relation lies in the fact that the labor-market 
participation condition holds with inequality in (6), which will be true even under 
the perfect foresight about the aggregate state.
IV. Summary
The cyclical behavior of aggregate hours worked, wages, and consumption is 
hard to reconcile with the equilibrium outcome of the representative-agent model 
with standard preferences. Attempts to estimate preferences based on optimality 
conditions of a stand-in household often fail to deliver economically meaningful 
estimates. Either a commodity or leisure has to be an inferior good for the observed 
allocation to be an optimum. Unreasonable estimates of preference parameters are 
interpreted as evidence that the economy operates outside the labor-supply schedule 
in the short run due to, say, sticky wages. We demonstrate that this incompatibil-
ity between the equilibrium of a representative-agent model and the aggregate data 
can reflect a failure of aggregation rather than that of the market, suggesting that 
12 See Krusell and Smith (2006) for various applications of this method.
13 In our benchmark-model simulation, the forecasting function of equilibrium prices (w and r) yields r2 of 
0.997 and 0.988, respectively. See Appendix C in Chang and Kim (2007) for the accuracy of forecasting functions 
of prices for the benchmark model.
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outcomes of a heterogeneous-agent economy are not readily represented by an opti-
mum of a representative-agent model with stable preferences.
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